



Severe financial stress in sectors of the economy
often is accompanied by calls for protective
government intervention. We have heard those
calls in the cases of Chrysler Corporation and Con-
tinentallllinois Bank. More recently, attention has
focused on the Farm Credit System, which is reel-
ing from depressed conditions in agriculture.
Representatives from the Farm Credit Administra-
tion have proposed a numberof "self-help"
measures as well as legislative changes calling for
greater centralization of decisionmaking in the
Farm (::redit System and more flexibility in the
system's ability to redistribute its capital. The
measure that has generated considerable debate
within the Congress and the Administration is the
request for a line of credit with the Treasury for the
Farm Credit Administration. In this Letter, we pro-
vide some background on the Farm Credit System
and its financial problems, and discuss the implica-
tions of Treasury aid.
Abrief sketch
The Farm Credit System (FCS) is an elaborate
cooperative, borrower-owned network of farm
lending banks under the supervision, examination
and coordination of the Farm Credit Administration
(FCA), an independent federal agency. Adminis-
tratively, the FCS is composedof12 regional farm
credit districts. As of September1985, FCS loans
outstanding totalled $70.7 billion.
The 12 Federal land Banks (one in,each district)
account for most of the loans in the system, or
about 68 percent. These land Banks make long-
term mortgage loans through the more than 400 '
Federal land Bank Associations. Twelve Federal
Intermediary Credit Banks account for about 22
percent of the system's loans and comprise the
main source of funds for the Production Credit As-
sociations (PCAs). Some 370 PCAs make primarily
short-term production loans to their members.
Thirteen Banks for Cooperatives (there is one
central bank for cooperatives) are important
sources of funds foragricultural and aquatic
cooperatives. The loans extended by the Farm
Credit System generally have floating rates. Most
loan rates are adjusted only with the approval of
the FCA and afew loans are linked bycontract to
market rates.
Since 1979, the FCS has funded its loans and other
assets primarily through the issuance of system-
wide consolidated obligations. Priorto that date,
individual components of the Farm Credit System
raised funds independently. The liabilities ofthe
Farm Credit System consist mainly of 6- and 9-
month securities and intermediate term coupon
instruments (mostly securities with maturities in
the range of2 to 5 years). The system also issues
short-term discount notes on a more or less con-
tinuous basis (currently about $10 billion outstcmd-
ing).
Dimensions of the problem
The financial fate of the Farm Credit System is tied
in large part to the health of its members - the
farmers. In the 1970s, prospects for farmers, as
reflected in the sharp rise of farm land values, were
quite good. In the early 1980s, inflation expecta-
tions dropped sharply and broughtdown the rapid
appreciation of real estate in generaL At the-same
time, the farmers were hit by the effects ofa strong
dollar and a high volume of agricultural production
worldwide. The FCS (as well as otheragricultural
lenders) found itself facing borrowers with heavy
debt obligations, weakening incomes, and declin-
ing land values - the latter representing collateral
for much of its loans.
With the deterioration in farm incomes and land
prices, outstanding FCS loans have contracted by
about $7 billion from the peak level reached in
1982-83.The contraction in loans by the FCS,
however, has done little to protect the system
from a deterioration in the quality of its assets. At
the 37 FCS banks, loans reported as notaccruing
interest rose from $2.0 billion in June 1985 to $3.5
billion in September, but even this higher figure
understates the problem. Representatives of the
FCS have indicated that overthe next couple of
years, assets in the system notaccruing interest
(real estate and loans) could rise to $13 billion.
The total value of "problem assets" of the Farm
CreditSystem, ofcourse, is notat risk because
many loans are collateralized to some extent.
Nevertheless, Farm Credit System losses are
expected to rise sharply in the near future. By its
own estimate, the Farm Credit System expects to
lose as much as $3 billion over the 1985-87 period.FRBSF
Critical to the FCS' capacity to handle these prob-
lems is the strength of its capital position. As of
September1985, the bookvalue of the capital,
surplus and reserves of the 37 banks in the FCS was
about $9.6 billion. On the surface at least, given
the projected losses in capital position, the FCS
would appearable to handle the current scope of
its problems. These problems, however, involve
more than the capacity of the FCS' current level of
capital to absorb losses.
Complications
The problems of the Farm Credit System are com-
plicated by the uneven distributionoffinancial
strains in agriculture. "Nonperforming loans" as a
percentof total loans vary considerably among the
units of the Farm Credit System. Even in June of this
year, before market concern overthe financial con-
dition of the FCS intensified; the percentage was
quite high at some individual units, particularlythe
Spokane and Omahaintermediate credit banks,
both of which have required special assistance.
Because of the uneven distribution of problems,
the Farm Credit System has had to take steps to
redistribute networth internally. The problems at
the Spokane bankwere handled through the
purchase of bad loans by the newly formed Farm
Credit Capital Corporation. Other banks in the FCS
helped the Omaha bank by buying bad loans and
sharingtheir capital.
However, there has been some reluctance among
the stronger units in the Farm CreditSystem to
redistribute capital. As a result, the FCA has asked
the Congress for more centralized authority toset
the criteria under which the Farm Credit Capital
Corporation can make assessments on individual
units or require system institutions to purchase
Capital Corporation stock.
Another source of concern for the Farm Credit
System is the withdrawal of capital by its members.
The FCS is a cooperative system in which capital is
obtained from the members; farmers borrowing
from thesystem simultaneously subscribe to
capital. For example, a borrower of $100,000
typically must also purchase between $5,000and
$10,000 in capital.
However, as the quality of the FCS loan portfolio
.has deteriorated, there has been a flight of some
good borrowers. They have paid off their loans and
left the system in orderto recover the value of
their invested capital. Members of the FCS have
the incentive to do this since capital contributions
can be withdrawn at par value. In extremecases,
some FCS banks are attemptingto prohibit the
withdrawal of capital when a member pays off
loans, butsuch action has not been undertaken on
a systemwide basis.
The problem of adverse selection of borrowers in
the Farm CreditSystem is further exacerbated by
the system's approach to pricing loans. TheFCS
generally prices loans by employing the average
costof the system's liabilities. As a consequence,
when market rates were rising sharply in the 1970s,
the Farm Credit System was making loans available
at rates considerably below market rates sinc~
much of the outstanding debt had been issued at
lower rates.
More recently, average cost pricing has tended to
hold up FCS rates as market rates have fallen from
peak levels. Moreover, when pricing loans, units in
the FCS must take intoaccountthe need for
reserves, expenses and capital requirements,
which, in the currentenvironment, also. would add
to loan rates. For example, the large volume of
nonperforming loans must be carried by higher
overall interest rates on FCS loans.
Cost of funds
Interest rates on loans from the FCS also are
affected by whatthe system'sfinancial problems
have done to its costoffunds. Historically,
securities of the FCS as well as otheragencies have
traded with yields slightly above those on com-
parable Treasury securities. In part, the relatively
low cost of funds for the federally sponsored agen-
cies has been related to special factors suchas the
exemption of interest income from state and local
taxes, as well as the financial soundness of the
agencies. But, the narrow spread between yields
on FCS and Treasury securities has been viewed
mainly as an indication of the market's belief that
the agency's securities are implicitly guaranteed by
the fe<;ieral government.
Overthe past several months, the market's con-
cern overthe quality of the FCS loan portfolio has
offsetat least some ofthe funding advantages
afforded the FCS as a sponsored agency. The chart
shows the spread in yields on FCS debt maturing in










MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV
1985
• Estimated spreads on Farm Credit System (FCS) s,:curities
over Treasury securities maturing in six months. EstImates
are based on data for the last five business days of each
month.
securities. As the chart indicates, yields on FCS
debt ballooned in September. The figures reflect
datafor the last week ofthe month, but concern in
the market was apparent insecondary market trad-
ing earlier in September. The higher spreads on FCS
debt persisted through late November.
Treasury assistance
In part because of the market's reaction to its prob-
lems, the FCA asked the Congress for assistance in
the form ofa line of credit with the Treasury. In
early December, thefull Senate and the House
Agriculture Committee voted to authorize the
Treasury to lend to the FCS as a backstop source of
liquidity. (The Senate and House versions ofthe bill
also provide for greater regulatory powers for ~he
FCA and centralization of the process for pooling
FCS resources to help troubled units in the system.)
The financial assistance that the Congress would
give the FCS does stop shortof formally guarantee-
ing the system's securities. However, formal back-
ing of FCS debt may not be required to reassure
the market, at least as far as FCS security holders
are concerned. We note that, to the extentTrea-
sury lending to the FCS facilitates the repayment of
private holders of the system's debt, the assistance
plan would provide some protection for the
system's current security holders.
Perhaps even more relevant, it is notclear that the
market's reaction up to this point has been due pri-
marily to worries thatthe FCS would be allowed to
default on its debt. The "risk premia" on the FCS
debt may reflect the concerns about liquidity risk
should short-term cash flow problems delay dis-
bursements more than default risk perse. (Such a
situation is similar to that observed in 1984during
the Continental Illinois crisis when, even with the
FDIC's guarantee of all of the bank's deposits, the
market demanded substantial interest rate premia
on large CDs issued by Continental compared with
those ofother money center banks.)
From the pointof view of the FCS, the reassurance
of its bondholders would be beneficial since it
could reduce the system's interestcosts. A!so, the
willingness of theTreasury to provide funds to the
FCS could.allow for a more orderly disposal of
assets by the system that could, in turn, dampen
the FCS' losses.
Nevertheless, Treasury lending is by no means a
cure-all for the. FCS. The measures as they stand do
notaddress the system's fundamental problem -
the quality of its loans and the potential for sizea-
ble permanent losses from bad loans. Financial aid
will not turn bad loans into good loans. If Treasury
aid is limited strictly to the provision of liquidity,
members (capital holders) of the Farm Credit
System still are at risk.
Summary
The depressed condition in the farm sector.has .
taken its toll on farm lenders. The problem IS partic-
ularly acute for the FCS since it specializes in lend-
ing to supportagriculture. The FCS ~o~ only mus~
face the problem of managing an eXisting portfolio
of problem loans, butalso the threatthat better
quality borrowers will leave the system and
thereby reduce its level of capital.
The Congress has acted on requests for a greater.
centralization of decisionmaking in the Farm Credit
System, including giving the system mo.re au:hority
to redistribute its networth as well as finanCial
assistance in the form of a line ofcredit with the
Treasury. The potential for backstop lendi~?by the
Treasury is intended to reassure FCS secuntles
holders. Such reassurance would benefitthe
system, in part, by reducing its co:tof fu.nds. Even
with such aid, the FCS expectsto Incur sizeable
losses because ofthe rising volume of nonperform-
ing loans.
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1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.s. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
























BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollar amounts in millions)
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency (- )
Borrowings
Netfree reserves (+)/Net borrowed(-)




Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 198,473 1,255 11,680 6.2
Loans and Leases' 6 179,804 952 11,612 6.9
Commercial and Industrial 51,803 554 - 774 - 1.4
Real estate 65,669 29 4,125 6.7
Loans to Individuals 38,044 240 7,036 22.6
Leases 5,427 11 376 7.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,342 _ 215 - 300 - 2.5
OtherSecurities2 7,327 88 369 5.3
Total Deposits 203,961 3,160 14,839 7.8
Demand Deposits 51,824 3,060 9,007 21.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 33,081 368 4,689 16.5
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,338 86 2,134 17.4
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 137,799 14 3,697 2.7
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 45,737 - 67 5,703 14.2
Time Deposits in Amounts-of
$100,000 or more 38,465 125 - 2,119 - 5.2
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 26,117 1,620 4,213 19.2